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United States v. Reidel: Resolving an Ambiguity
in Obscenity Control
A federal postal inspector, stating that he was over twenty-one years old,
responded to defendant's advertisement in a newspaper by sending money in
return for the shipment of a booklet entitled "The True Facts About Imported
Pornography." Upon receipt of the booklet, the inspector obtained a warrant
to search defendant's premises and found similar booklets and mailing en-
velopes which had been returned "undelivered." A three-count indictment was
returned against the defendant for violating section 1461, title eighteen, which
prohibits the knowing use of the mails for the delivery of obscene matter.1 The
defendant contended that the statute was unconstitutional, both on its face and
as applied. Assuming arguendo that the booklets were obscene, a motion to
dismiss was granted by the trial judge.! The lower court held that individuals
could not be restricted from sending commercial obscene matters through the
mails to willing adult recipients." The statute was not declared invalid, but was
held not applicable to this "particular prosecution." Held, reversed: Section
1461 is not unconstitutional as applied to the distribution of obscene matters
through the mails to willing recipients even though they state that they are
adults. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
I. THE EVOLUTION OF PROSCRIPTIONS AGAINST THE DISTRIBUTION
OF OBSCENE MATERIAL
The first amendment to the United States Constitution encompasses a num-
ber of personal rights, among which are the freedoms of speech and press."
These freedoms embrace the right to distribute constitutionally protected litera-
ture and necessarily preserve the right to receive it.! This right is not absolute,'
'18 U.S.C. S 1461 (1964) states in part:
Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement
. . of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or
from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or
things may be obtained or made ....
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails
or delivered from any post office ....
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing... or delivery of any-
thing declared by this section to be nonmailable ... shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first
such offense ....
'United States v. Reidel, No. 5845-HP-Criminal (C.D. Cal., July 8, 1970).31d.
41d.
5 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abolishing the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
'Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Lowell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
'See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957): "All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing Climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties, un-
less excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests."
See also United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1101 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1879): "Freedom of the press does not include freedom to use the mails for the purpose of
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for its exercise must be balanced against the state's interest in controlling the
distribution of certain kinds of material.' One class of material that a state may
validly control under the first amendment is "obscene material.""
The forerunner of the current federal statute on the distribution of obscene
materials was the Comstock Act, which provided that no obscene materials
could be carried through the mails." For the first time it became a felony to
send such matter through the mails. The act was held constitutional in In re
Jackson," in which the Court affirmed the authority of Congress to prohibit the
use of the mails for the distribution of material which it regarded as contrary
to public morals. In 1879 a decision was reached under this statute which spe-
cifically held that "freedom of the press does not include freedom to use the
distributing obscene literature, and no right or privilege of the press is infringed by the
exclusion of obscene literature from the mails."8 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
' The modern definition of obscenity was first stated fully in Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 489 (1957): "[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." After Roth a three-pronged test for ascertaining obscenity evolved and is currently
in effect: (a) the material must be utterly without redeeming social value; (b) the domi-
nant theme of the material must appeal to the prurient interest; and (c) the material must
be patently offensive. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418-19 (1966). If these cri-
teria are met in a particular circumstance, Roth holds that the material may be constitu-
tionally regulated.
The first attempt to define obscenity was made in Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360,
371 (1868), an English decision, which established the criteria as being "whether the ten-
dency of the matter . . . is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." This test gained ac-
ceptance in America as "the guideline" for defining "obscene" in United States v. Bennett,
24 F. Cas. 1093, 1102 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879). Bennett expanded the definition
to require that the material in some "substantial part tended to deprave and corrupt." Id.
The first departure from the English definition came in 1913 when Judge Learned Hand
in dictum indicated his preference for a more modern definition of "obscenity":
[Hiowever consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals, does not seem to
me to answer to the understanding and morality of the present time, as con-
veyed by the words, 'obscene, lewd, or lascivious.' I question whether in the
end men will regard that as obscene which is honestly relevant to the adequate
expression of innocent ideas, and whether they will not believe that truth and
beauty are too precious to society at large to be mutilated in the interests of
those most likely to pervert them to base uses. Indeed, it seems hardly likely
that we are even to-day so lukewarm in our interest in letters or serious dis-
cussion as to be content to reduce our treatment of sex to the standard of a
child's library in the supposed interest of a salacious few, or that shame will
for long prevent us from adequate portrayal of some of the most serious
and beautiful sides of human nature ....
United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
Hand cast doubt upon the applicability of the old rule to the "morality of the present
time" and in effect was seeking a reconsideration of it. He condemned a system which, in
order to protect the infirm, denied to the mature in the community its rightful share of
serious literature and new insights.
Hand's suggestion was adopted in United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir.
1930), in which the Second Circuit held that even though a work may sexually arouse the
desires of some, the statute does not "bar from the mails everything which might stimulate
sex impulses." (Emphasis in original.) It was from this decision that the "dominant theme"
requirement, which has been adopted as the modern rule, evolved.
10 Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, § 31, 19 Stat. 90. In 1821 Vermont became the first
state to enact a law against the distribution of obscene pictures. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
2801 (1957) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 30, 1821, R.S. 99, § 10). In 1842 the first
federal act was passed which limited the distribution of "imported" matters. Act of Aug. 30,
1842, ch. 270, § 28, 5 Star. 548. This act did not concern itself with printed matter, but
solely with works of nude art. In 1857 an amendment was passed which included the dis-
tribution of such articles as photographs and printed materials. Act of Mar. 2, 1857, ch. 63,
11 Stat. 168.11 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
mails for the purpose of distributing obscene literature."1 The reach of the
Comstock Act was narrowed in United States v. Dennett, which held that the
statute was never thought to bar from the mails "everything that might stimu-
late sexual impulses."" Moreover, in Martin v. City of Struthers the Supreme
Court reaffirmed an earlier statement that freedom of speech and of the press
"embraces the right to distribute literature ... and necessarily ... [protects]
the right to receive it."'4 But in Roth v. United States" the Court stated that
obscenity was not within the area protected by freedoms of speech or press,
and thus the statutes prohibiting the mailing of obscene matters did not violate
the free speech guarantee of the first amendment and its applicability to the
states through the fourteenth amendment." This decision was further strength-
ened by the holding of the Court that "the federal obscenity statute punishing
the use of the mails for distributing obscene material is a proper exercise of the
postal power delegated to Congress by article I, section 8, clause 7.'""
If Roth stood alone the question of whether the state can regulate the distri-
bution of obscene material to willing adult recipients would have resulted in
an easy and obvious affirmative answer. However, the more recent decision of
Stanley v. Georgia" cast some doubt on the continuing vitality of Roth. In Stan-
ley pornographic films were found in the defendant's home, and he was con-
victed under Georgia law for possessing obscene material. His conviction was
reversed by the Court on the basis that mere private possession of obscene mat-
ter cannot constitutionally be made a crime. It was questioned whether the de-
cision abjured or at least impliedly overruled Roth, since if a person has the
right to receive and possess this material, then someone must have the right to
deliver it to him." This ambiguity was presented in Reidel.
II. UNITED STATES V. REIDEL
In United States v. Reidel" the Supreme Court held constitutional the pro-
visions of section 1461, title eighteen,2" which prohibit the knowing use of the
mails for the delivery of obscene materials based on the Court's interpretation
that the first amendment does not insulate obscenity from statutory regulation."
"United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879).
*.339 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930) (emphasis in original).
14319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943).
'5 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
"Id. at 485.
17 Id. at 493.
I"394 U.S. 557 (1969).
"9See, e.g., Note, Obscenity-Federal Statute Allowing Prosecution for Mailing Non-
Mailable Obscene Material to Requesting Adults Is an Unconstitutional Infringement of
First Amendment Free Speech, 49 TEXAs L. REv. 575 (1971).
2*402 U.S. 351 (1971).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
2Reidel, in following Roth and distinguishing Stanley, fails to mention Redrup v. New
York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). Redrup had held that paperback books and magazines not
published in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for unwilling individuals to
avoid exposure to them and not containing pandering were protected in distribution by the
first and fourteenth amendments from governmental suppression whether criminal or civil,
in personam or in rem, pursuant to statutes not reflecting specific and limited state concern
for juveniles. Redrup ostensibly set up the only three instances in which the Court would
hear an obscenity case: when protection of juveniles from obscenity was concerned; when
there had been an invasion of individual privacy; and when there had been pandering. Reidel,
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The Court, in reversing the lower court holding, emphatically stated Roth had
not been overruled, that it governed the principal case, and that section 1461
was the appropriate standard to be applied in judging distribution of obscene
materials. Having found almost identical issues in Reidel and Roth, the Court
merely affirmed the similar principles established in Roth.
The decision is most notable for its clarification of the conflict which many
writers in the area had found to exist between Roth and Stanley. Stanley had
stood in apparent contradistinction to Roth. Notwithstanding this conflict the
Court in Reidel followed Roth and stated that Stanley compelled no different
result since it was restricted to the possession and not the distribution of obscene
materials. Stanley had held that "the first and fourteenth amendments prohibit
making mere possession of obscene materials a crime....3 This statement im-
plied, in contrast to Roth, that obscenity, at least in the circumstances specified,
was within the area of constitutionally protected speech and press. Such a hold-
ing would also have severely undermined, if not destroyed, the Roth rationale
for upholding the statute in Reidel. While Roth did not specifically mention the
distribution-possession distinction, Roth appeared to give the state the power to
regulate, while Stanley appeared to take that power away.
In the face of this conflict the Court quickly pointed out that Roth remains
valid law and that Stanley is strictly limited to the facts it presents. Upon ex-
amining the facts in Stanley it was apparent that its rationale was rooted in the
right of privacy rather than the right to possess obscene material per se. Some
obscenity is thus protected to the extent of its relationship to the right of pri-
vacy. For example, the state could not control the thoughts of an individual
since an exercise of such control would be an invasion of the individual's right
to privacy. If an individual has obscene books in the privacy of his home or if
he is thinking obscene thoughts, he is constitutionally protected from govern-
ment intrusion.' However, the basis for affording such protection would not be
a determination that the obscenity was constitutionally protected, but would be
based on the penumbral right of privacy, which is protected from governmental
intrusion.' Thus, obscenity would be shielded if present in a "privacy situation,"
as in Stanley, but otherwise it would not be, and would be subject to the right
of the state to protect public morality.
In Reidel there are "no complaints about governmental violations of his
private thoughts or fantasies," but a claim to a first amendment right to do
at least on the facts, would appear to fall into either one of these latter two categories. The
Court apparently did not feel compelled to categorize Reidel in any one category. On the
other hand it could be said that the Court was expanding the criteria it established in Redrup
if Reidel did not fall within one of the three instances. A third solution would be that the
Court was impliedly overruling Redrup.
394 U.S. at 568.
"Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not
think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment means any-
thing. it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage re-
bels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." Id. at 565.
"5Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965): "IT1he First Amendment has
a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion." Under this theory the
"right to privacy" is raised to the status of an independent right which results from the
penumbra cast by the specific constitutional rights, without resting the right squarely on any
one of them.
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business in obscenity and use the mails in the process.' Clearly under Roth such
a right remains unprotected.
In conclusion the Court touched on the argument that adults should have
the right to receive whatever communicative materials they desire. The Court's
reply was that "the task of restructuring the obscenity laws lies with those who
pass, repeal, and amend statutes and ordinances. Roth and like cases pose no
obstacle to such development."" Thus, if any change is to occur, the legislature,
and not the judicial system, must act.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court remains consistent with prior decisions in upholding the constitu-
tionality of acts prohibiting the use of mails for distributing obscene materials.
The theory that the state has an exigent interest in protecting its children ap-
parently will prevail to uphold the banning of distribution of obscene materials.
The Court in Reidel seems to be allowing the exigent interest rationale to ex-
tend to adults as well as children. Until legislatures act, the right to receive ob-
scenity regardless of its social value will be denied to willing adults.
Mr. Justice White, in the first such statement in a majority opinion, stated
that obscenity laws are "so inherently unenforceable without extravagant ex-
penditures of time and effort by enforcement officers"*" that such legislative
action may prove to be desirable. But again, it is the legislature and not the
judiciary that must act to achieve such an end.
Perhaps the significance of Reidel is not so much its reaffirmation of Roth,
but rather its emphatic distinction of Stanley from Roth and Reidel. Such a
clarification established that the government retains the right to protect public
morality.
Larry Van Smith
"e402 U.S. at 356.7 Id. at 357.
"Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968).
'402 U.S. at 357.
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